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Abstract
This note considers a variation of the full-information secretary problem
where the random variables to be observed are independent and identically
distributed. Consider X1, . . . ,Xn to be an independent sequence of random
variables, let Mn := max{X1, . . . ,Xn}, and the objective is to select the max-
imum of the sequence. What is the maximum probability of “stopping at
the maximum”? That is, what is the stopping time τ adapted to X1, ...,Xn
that maximizes P (Xτ = Mn)? This problem was examined by Gilbert and
Mosteller [1] when in addition the common distribution is continuous. The
optimal win probability in this case is denoted by v∗n,max. What if it is de-
sired to “stop within a proportion of the maximum”? That is, for 0 < α < 1,
what is the stopping rule τ that maximizes P (Xτ ≥ αMn)? In this note both
problems are treated as games, it is proven that for any continuous random
variable X, if τ∗ is the optimal stopping rule then P (Xτ∗ ≥ αMn) ≥ v
∗
n,max,
and this lower bound is sharp. Some examples and another interesting result
are presented.
AMS 2010 subject classification: 60G40 (primary) Key words and phrases:
Choosing the maximum, Stopping time, Sharp inequalities for stochastic pro-
cesses, Optimal stopping
1 Introduction
In the classical secretary problem (CSP) or the largest of an unknown set of num-
bers (Googol), a manager must select the best applicant among a known number n
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of applicants. There is only one position available and he will interview one by one
in random order. Immediately after the interview he must decide whether or not the
applicant is hired based only on the relative ranks of the applicants interviewed so
far. An applicant once rejected cannot be recalled. It is well known that using the
optimal strategy, the probability of success decreases monotonically to 1/e ≈ .3679
as n→∞. For an entertaining exposition of the CSP see Ferguson [2].
An immediate extension of the CSP is the full-information best-choice prob-
lem in which each applicant independent of the others, can receive a numerical
score whose distribution is known in advance and the objective is to select the
highest score. The mathematical framework for this problem is as follows. Let
X1, . . . , Xn be independent random variables with known continuous distributions,
let Mn := max{X1, . . . , Xn}, and consider supτ P(Xτ =Mn) where the supremum is
over all stopping times adapted to the natural filtration of X1, . . . , Xn. Gilbert and
Mosteller [1] solved this optimal stopping problem when the sequence is independent
and identically distributed. The optimal stopping rule depends on a sequence of
decision numbers di, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, so that a gambler must stop at the first observa-
tion i such that Xi = Mi and F (Xi) ≥ di, or at time n if no such i exists. They
computed the optimal win probability for some values of n, denoted by v∗n,max, are
shown in Table 1. This optimal win probability is independent of the distribution of
the Xi’s. What if it is desired to “stop within a proportion of the maximum”? That
is, for 0 < α < 1, what is the stopping rule τ that maximizes P (Xτ ≥ αMn)? The
examples in Section 2 will show that the optimal stopping rule is cumbersome to
calculate and that the win probability depends on the distribution. Moreover there
is no close form expression to compute the optimal win probability as examined in
[1]. In this note these two problem are treated as games for comparison. Notation
and definitions are now introduced.
Game Max. Win is to stop at an observation that is the maximum of the sequence;
Xτ ≥ max{X1, . . . , Xn}.
Game Proportion of the Max. Win is to stop at an observation that is at least
a proportion 0 < α < 1 of the maximum of the sequence;
Xτ ≥ αmax{X1, . . . , Xn}.
Here τ is any stopping rule adapted to X1, . . . , Xn.
For the i.i.d. sequence (X1, . . . , Xn) of random variables having the same distri-
bution as X , let
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• Mi := max{X1, . . . , Xi}, i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
• Vn,max(X, τ) be the probability of win playing the Game Max for X using the
stopping rule τ ,
• Vn,αmax(X, σ) be the probability of win playing the Game Proportion of the
Max for X using the stopping rule σ,
• τ ∗ be the optimal stopping rule for Game Max,
• σ∗ be the optimal stopping rule for Game Proportion of the Max,
• V ∗n,max(X) := sup
τ
Vn,max(X, τ) = Vn,max(X, τ
∗),
• V ∗n,αmax(X) := sup
σ
Vn,αmax(X, σ) = Vn,αmax(X, σ
∗),
A candidate is defined to be an observation that has a positive probability to win
the game in question. In Game Max Xi is a candidate if Xi ≥ αMi. Thus, suppose
a gambler is to observe X1, · · · , Xn, he can win at observation i if Xi is a candidate
and the remaining n − i are no greater than Xi. Similarly in Game Proportion of
the Max, Xi is a candidate if Xi ≥ αMi. Note that if a gambler is playing both
games when he wins in Game Max, he wins in Game Proportion of the Maximum as
well. The converse is not necessarily true, this makes Game Proportion of the Max
”easier” to win and hence the optimal win probability in Game Proportion of the
Max is at least the optimal win probability in Game Max. The main result of this
note makes this precise.
Theorem 1.1. For each n ≥ 1, for any continuous random variable X,
V ∗n,αmax(X) ≥ v
∗
n,max
and the inequality is sharp.
Where the values for v∗n,max were found by [1] and are given in Table 1.
Remark 1.2. Although the Theorem is stated when the common distribution of
X is continuous, allowing the distribution to be discrete should make the Game
Proportion of the Max easier to win due to the ties. Hence the sharp lower bound
should hold as well. It is not clear how to make a proof of this.
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The idea of the proof is to examine the worst case for a gambler. This is, playing
Game Proportion of the Max with a distribution space out enough so that the advan-
tage over Game Max is lost. The adequate distribution is given in at the beginning
of Section 3. Then in Lemma 3.1 it is proven that the win probability of Game Pro-
portion of the Max is arbitrarily close to Game Max. Finally, using the respective
optimal stopping rules from both games and the use of inequalities, Theorem 1.1
yields.
Table 1: Optimal win probabilities for some values of n observations in Game Max
[1]
n v∗n,max n v
∗
n,max
1 1.0000 10 .608699
2 .750000 15 .598980
3 .684293 20 .594200
4 .655396 30 .589472
5 .639194 40 .587126
50 .585725
∞ .580164
2 Examples
The following distributions are examined: discrete uniform and uniform. The fol-
lowing win probabilities are needed for computations, for k = 1, . . . , n let
Uk(x1, . . . , xk) : = P (xk ≥ αMn|X1 = x1, . . . , Xk = xk)
=
{
P
(
max{Xk+1, . . . , Xn} ≤
xk
α
)
if xk ≥ αmax{x1, . . . , xk−1}
0, otherwise,
where max ∅ := −∞. Denote the expression in the first case above simply by Uk(xk),
and note that
Uk(xk) =
(
F
(xk
α
))n−k
.
Let
Wk(x1, . . . , xk) := sup
k<τ≤n
P (Xτ ≥ αMn|X1 = x1, . . . , Xk = xk).
Uk(x1, . . . , xk) is interpreted as the win probability if stopping at time k after ob-
serving X1 = x1, . . . , Xk = xk, and Wk(x1, . . . , xk) as the optimal win probability
when taking at least one more observation after observing X1 = x1, . . . , Xk = xk.
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Example 2.1. Discrete Uniform Distribution. Let
P (X = x) = p(x) = 1/10 for x = 1, 2, . . . , 10.
Case n = 2. The random variables X1, X2 will be observed and the optimal stopping
rule is found using backward induction.
At observation 2 we must stop. At observation 1 we stop if
U1(x1) = P (x1 ≥ αX2) ≥W1(x1) = P (X2 ≥ αx1) ⇔⌊x1
α
⌋
+ ⌈αx1⌉ ≥ 11
Thus x∗1(α) must be found so that for x1 ≥ x
∗
1(α) the previous inequality holds.
If α ≥ 1/2 and we observe a value less than 5, continuing give us a higher prob-
ability of win. The probability of win is
E (max{W1(X), U1(X)}) =
10∑
x=1
max {W1(x), U1(x)} p(x)
=
1
10

 10∑
x=x∗
1
(α)
min
{
1,
⌊
x1
α
⌋
10
}
+
x∗
1
(α)−1∑
x=1
(
11− (⌈αx1⌉)
10
)
For the given values of α, Table 2 below shows the corresponding x∗1(α) and the
respective win probability. The table suggests that for small values of α the Game
Proportion of the Max can always be won. The following proposition generalizes this
idea.
Table 2: Optimal win probabilities for discrete uniform distribution on {1, 2, . . . , 10}
α 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
x∗1(α) 1 2 3 4 5 5 5 5 6
P (win) 1 1 1 0.99 0.98 0.94 0.9 0.86 0.81
Proposition 2.2. For any n ≥ 2, let X be a random variable. Then V ∗n,αmax(X) = 1
if and only if X has support on [m,M ] where 0 < m ≤M <∞ and either (i) α2 ≤ m
M
or (ii) P (m
α
< X < αM) = 0.
Proof. First, we show that if (i) or (ii) then V ∗n,αmax(X) = 1. Consider τ := min{1 ≤
i ≤ n−1 : Xi ≥ αM} or τ := n if no such i exists. Under either of the two conditions,
it is trivial that for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1,
P (Xi ≥ αmax{Xi+1, . . . , Xn}|max{X1, . . . , Xi−1} < αM,Xi ≥ αM) = 1.
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And at observation n, if (i), we have
P (Xn ≥ αmax{X1, . . . , Xn−1}|max{X1, . . . , Xn−1} < αM) ≥ P (Xn ≥ m) = 1.
If (ii), we have
P (Xn ≥ αmax{X1, . . . , Xn−1}|max{X1, . . . , Xn−1} < αM) ≥ P (Xn ≥ m) = 1,
since max{X1, . . . , Xn−1} < αM and X does not have mass between
m
α
and αM it
follows that max{X1, . . . , Xn−1} ≤
m
α
, thus αmax{X1, . . . , Xn−1} ≤ m. Hence for
any of the two conditions V ∗n,αmax(X) = 1. Conversely, it is clear that the distribution
of X must have support on [m,M ] for some 0 < m ≤ M < ∞ and either α2 ≤ m
M
or α2 > m
M
is satisfied. Suppose α2 > m
M
and assume that for some ǫ > 0, X has
mass on the interval I := [m
α
+ ǫ, αM − ǫ]. If we observe X1 ∈ I and stop, we lose
if there exists l > 1 such that M − ǫ
α
< Xl. If we continue, we lose if for all l > 1,
Xl < m+ αǫ. It follows that no stopping rule gives a win probability of 1 unless the
interval I has probability 0. Hence (ii) must be satisfied.
Remark 2.3. This result holds for any random variable while the Theorem is proven
for a continuous random variable.
Example 2.4. Continuous Uniform Distribution on (0, 1)
Case n = 2. The random variables X1, X2 will be observed and the optimal stopping
rule is found using backward induction.
At observation 2 we must stop. At observation 1 stop if
U1(x1) = P (x1 ≥ αX2) ≥W1(x1) = P (X2 ≥ αx1) ⇔
min{1,
x1
α
} ≥ 1− αx1 ⇔
x1 ≥
α
1 + α2
:= x∗1(α).
The probability of win is
E (max{W1(X), U1(X)}) =
∫ 1
x∗
1
(α)
U1(x)dx+
∫ x∗
1
(α)
0
W1(x)dx
=
∫ α
x∗
1
(α)
x
α
dx+
∫ 1
α
1dx+
∫ x∗
1
(α)
0
(1− αx) dx
= 1−
α3
2(α2 + 1)
.
This is graphed in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Optimal win probabilities for the uniform(0, 1) distribution, n = 2
0.5 1
0.75
0.9
1
α
P (win)
From the previous examples it can been seen that the optimal stopping rule is
cumbersome to calculate since it depends on the common distribution. The prob-
ability of winning is in general high but, how low can the optimal win probability
be in Game Proportion of the Max? The main result of this note provides the best
lower bound.
3 A sharp lower bound.
To prove Theorem 1.1, a family of random variables is introduced with the property
that the values are so spread out so that advantage in Game Proportion of the
Max over Game Max is lost. In other words, the only possibility to win in Game
Proportion of the Max is to choose the maximum of the sequence.
Let Nα = min{N ∈ N|α >
1
N
} and consider the random variable Xk,ǫ with
density
fXk,ǫ(x) =
{
1
2ǫk
if (Nα + 1)
j − ǫ ≤ x ≤ (Nα + 1)
j + ǫ for j = 1, . . . , k,
0 otherwise,
k ∈ N. The value of ǫ must be chosen such that for j = 1, . . . , k − 1, the inequality
(Nα + 1)
j + ǫ < α(Nα + 1)
j+1 − ǫ
holds. Solving, it is enough for ǫ to satisfy
(Nα + 1)
j(αNα + α− 1)
α + 1
> ǫ
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when j = 1. The intervals where this density is positive are enough space out so that
the gambler’s advantage playing the Game Proportion of the Max over the Game
Max is lost. The following lemma makes this precise.
Lemma 3.1. For every n ≥ 1, given δ > 0, there exists k > 1 such that
Vn,αmax(X
k,ǫ, τ) ≤ Vn,max(X
k,ǫ, τ) + δ
for any stopping rule τ adapted to X1, · · · , Xn.
Proof. When n = 1, the result is trivial. Let n > 1 and δ > 0. The idea of the proof
is that a gambler is observing the sequence and playing both games with the same
strategy. It’s straightforward that if he wins in the Game Max, he also wins in the
Game Proportion of the Max but the converse may not be true.
Thus,
Vn,αmax(X
k,ǫ, τ)− Vn,max(X
k,ǫ, τ) = P (B), (1)
where B is the event that the gambler wins in Game Proportion of the Max and
loses in Game Max using the stopping rule τ . To simplify calculations, the following
random variables are introduced. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let
Zi =
{
j if (Nα + 1)
j − ǫ ≤ Xk,ǫi ≤ (Nα + 1)
j + ǫ for j = 1, . . . , k,
then the event B is contained in the event where the sequence (Z1, . . . , Zn) does not
have a unique maximum. It follows that
P (B) ≤ P ((Z1, . . . , Zn) does not have a unique maximum)
= 1− P ((Z1, . . . , Zn) has a unique maximum).
For i = 1, . . . , n, let Ai be the event that the sequence (Z1, . . . , Zn) has the unique
maximum at observation i. These events are clearly mutually exclusive. Then
P (B) ≤ 1− P
(
n⋃
i=1
Ai
)
= 1−
n∑
i=1
P (Ai) .
Since the unique maximum Zi = j for some j ∈ {2, . . . , k}, each Ai can be expressed
as the union of mutually exclusive events
Ai =
k⋃
j=2
[
{Zi = j} ∩
⋂
l 6=i
{Zl < Zi}
]
.
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Thus
P (Ai) =
k∑
j=2
P
(
{Zi = j} ∩
⋂
l 6=i
{Zl < j}
)
,
and so
P (B) ≤ 1−
n∑
i=1
k∑
j=2
P
(
{Zi = j} ∩
⋂
l 6=i
{Zl < j}
)
= 1− n
k∑
j=2
1
k
(
j − 1
k
)n−1
.
Now, the limit of the summation as k →∞ is found:
lim
k→∞
k∑
j=2
1
k
(
j − 1
k
)n−1
= lim
k→∞
k−1∑
j=0
1
k
(
j
k
)n−1
=
∫ 1
0
tn−1dt =
1
n
,
since the summation on the left hand side is a Riemann sum of f(t) = tn−1 over
I = [0, 1].
So, let
kδ := min
{
k ≥ 1 :
1− δ
n
<
k−1∑
j=1
1
k
(
j
k
)n−1}
.
Then,
P (B) ≤ 1− n
kδ−1∑
j=1
1
kδ
(
j − 1
kδ
)n−1
< 1− n
1− δ
n
= δ.
Thus (1) holds for Xkδ,ǫ. This completes the proof.
Now, using the previous Lemma the proof of the Theorem is simple.
Proof of Theorem 1.1. Let n ≥ 1. It is straightforward that for any τ
{Xτ ≥ αMn} ⊇ {Xτ ≥Mn}.
(If the gambler wins in Game Max, he also wins in Game Proportion of the Max),
thus
Vn,αmax(X, τ) ≥ Vn,max(X, τ).
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In particular, when using the optimal stopping rule τ ∗ of the Game Max in both
games, it follows that
V ∗n,αmax(X) ≥ Vn,αmax(X, τ
∗) ≥ Vn,max(X, τ
∗) = v∗n,max
Now to prove that the bound is sharp, let δ > 0. By Lemma 3.1 there exists kδ such
that for the Xkδ,ǫ distribution if the gambler uses the optimal stopping rule σ∗ for
the Game Proportion of the Max in both games,
V ∗n,αmax(X
kδ,ǫ) = Vn,αmax(X
kδ,ǫ, σ∗) ≤ Vn,max(X
kδ,ǫ, σ∗) + δ
≤ V ∗n,max(X
kδ,ǫ) + δ
= v∗n,max + δ.
Thus for any δ > 0 there exists a distribution such that the optimal win probability
in Game Proportion of the Max is at most v∗n,max + δ. Hence the constant v
∗
n,max is
the best lower bound.
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